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Abstract
We explain the recent events in the German market for online access using
a model of a regulated monopoly renting phone lines to retailers. Retailers
offer either a linear or a flat tariff to consumers. Consumer heterogeneity
leads to adverse selectiion. We show why market entry for flatrate firms is
difficult under a linear wholesale tariff. With both a linear and a flat wholesale
tariff the consumer market shows a mixture of tariffs as well. When marginal
costs are zero it is optimal to have a wholesale flatrate only. However,
marginal moves towards this equilibrium are not always welfare improving.
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USA1 Introduction
In comparison to other countries, like the U.S. for example, it was di±cult to ¯nd internet
providers o®ering a °atrate1 for internet connection via the phone line to private households
in Germany in the past. In March 2001 the online information service www.°atrate.de listed a
total of six internet service providers (ISPs) o®ering a °atrate for 24 hour access. Five of the
¯rms charged more than E70 per month for this service and, additionally, a similar processing
fee. It is unlikely that these o®ers attract a lot of customers. According to a survey of the
German periodical PC-Welt from November 2000 only 1% of their readers would be willing to
pay more than E50 per month for a °atrate. This leaves the E40 °atrate of AOL as the only
o®er which is likely to have a substantial market share.2 On the other hand, a lot of ¯rms
entered the market with low prices, but they had to withdraw their °atrate o®ers later on.
According to www.°atrate.de nine ¯rms entered and left the market between in 1999 and 2000.
We believe that the reason for this fact lies in the pricing policy of the former state monopoly
Deutsche Telekom, which o®ers other competitors a wholesale price of about 0.75 cents per
minute for using its phone lines. On 16th November 2000 RegTP, the German government
authority regulating the Deutsche Telekom, decided that as of February 2001 Deutsche Telekom
has to o®er a wholesale °atrate additional to its linear pricing scheme to competitors. Deutsche
Telekom strongly opposed this decision and took the issue to the courts. On 16th March 2001
the administrative appeals court of North Rhine-Westphalia excused Deutsche Telekom from
o®ering a wholesale °atrate to its competitors until all the legal issues in the ruling have been
cleared up in court. It was in°uenced by the decision of t-online, the subsidiary of Deutsche
1With a °atrate the consumer pays a ¯xed amount for unlimited online access in a certain period, generally
a month. In a linear price tari®, by contrast, he pays a sum proportional to the time he is online.
2AOL is well known for its aggressive pricing policy. It is therefore an open question whether this o®er is
covering costs or is a form of predatory pricing to gain market share. This could be a pro¯table strategy if
customers have switching costs and AOL is able to exploit these switching costs later on. For a survey of the
literature on switching costs, see Klemperer (1995).
1Telekom o®ering internet access, to abandon its own °atrate a few weeks earlier. Currently
RegTP is not pushing the issue anymore and the prospects for an a®ordable internet access
°atrate for the majority of German households in the near future are dim. This contrasts
with recent developments in other countries in the European Union. The British regulation
authority Oftel successfully forced British Telecom to o®er a wholesale °atrate. Since the
introduction of FRIACO (Flatrate Internet Access Call Origination) the number of British
ISPs o®ering modestly priced °atrate internet access has soared. In Spain °at-rate Internet
access via the ¯xed telephony network was introduced by the Decree-law 2000/7 of 23 June
2000. France Telecom announced the introduction of a °atrate for 1 September 2001. The
tari® was negotiated with the French regulation authority ART, which estimates that this will
allow ISP's to o®er °atrate access for E28.1
The problem is that there is no alternative to Deutsche Telekom for ISPs that intend to serve
the national market. In fact, the situation in the ISP market is to a large extend a result of the
lack of competition in the market for local phone calls. While competition seems to work well
in the market for medium and long distance calls,2 Deutsche Telekom still had a market share
for the last mile of about 98% in 2000. Although it has to sell local loop lines to competitors if
households want to switch, the regulated price is too high to foster competition in this market
segment. Even after the decision of RegTP on 30th March 2001 to reduce the price by 5%
this is still substantially above the price Deutsche Telekom charges its customers. So far there
is no alternative to Deutsche Telekom for most households. Only in the big cities there is
limited competition by so called City Carriers that o®er local loop lines to businesses and to
some extend for private households. Interestingly, there are quite a number of low price °atrate
o®ers of ISPs that cooperate with City Carriers. Moreover, City Carriers o®er free local phone
1For recent information about the French market see http://www.art-telecom.fr.
2According to RegTP the market share of all competitors of Deutsche Telekom in this market exceeded 40%
in 2000. Also prices have decreased substantially. The price for a long distance call inside Germany during
daytime, for example, is only a tenth of the price before the deregulation. See www.regtp.de for the latest
numbers.
2calls for calls that originate and terminate inside their own net. For these calls they do not
have to pay interconnection fees to Deutsche Telekom which would be on a price per minute
basis. If these are competitive prices this suggests that true marginal costs are zero, an issue
that will be of relevance in the discussion of social welfare later on.
In this paper we present a model that tries to explain why market entry of ISPs o®ering a
°atrate is di±cult under the linear wholesale tari® of Deutsche Telekom. Why they cannot make
pro¯ts in a market where other providers use linear prices, despite a preference of consumers
for °atrates that we build into the model.1 An important feature of our model is consumer
heterogeneity, which plays a crucial role for providers o®ering a °atrate. The business model
announced by °atrate ¯rms that entered the German market in the past is generally built on
the idea of cross-subsidizing the high usage customers with revenues from low usage customers.
The ¯rm intends to make a pro¯t only on the average customer, not on every customer. We
model this heterogeneity buy assuming a distribution of utility functions implying di®erent
usage rates for a given °atrate.2 As expected, it turns out that a problem of °atrate ¯rms in
this model is adverse selection, they attract exactly those customers causing the highest costs.
We show that the business model described above does not work when lines have to be rented
under a linear wholesale tari®. The optimal °atrate when entering a competitive market is
so high, that the ¯rm makes pro¯t on every customer. It is unlikely, however, that customer
preferences for the °atrate are so high as to allow the ¯rm to gain any market share. Things are
di®erent when there is an additional wholesale °atrate. It is possible to show that a low enough
wholesale °atrate will lead to a di®erent market structure, with both °atrate and linear price
tari® having a certain market share. We argue that Deutsche Telekom resisted the °atrate,
1Such a preference is often invoked as one possible explanation for customers choosing a °atrate although
their ex-post expenditures would have been lower under a linear tari®. See the discussion in Mitchell and
Vogelsang (1991), p.191, for the market for phone calls.
2This distinguishes our model from the usual Hotelling type setup that is often used for telecommunication
networks. See La®ont et al. (1998a) and La®ont et al. (1998b) for a discussion. We believe that consumer
preferences for a certain network, as assumed in this framework, are not important in the provider market.
3because a °atrate that gains substantial market share would lower its pro¯ts. Although it is
necessary that Deutsche Telekom has revenues to pay for the maintenance costs of its network,
it would be the best if this money were raised with a °atrate fee only, because true marginal
costs are zero.1 However, only a discrete step to a °atrate only equilibrium is unambiguously
welfare improving in our model.
While our discussion is motivated by the situation in the market for internet access, the results
of our analysis are of a general nature and have other applications as well. The market for
local telephone calls, for example, has similar characteristics. If a competitor does not have
his own local loop lines, however, each call originates and terminates in the grid of Deutsche
Telekom. In contrast to internet service providing there is no possibility for a ¯rm to add value,
it can only act as a reseller. Maybe because it is more obvious in this case that reselling with
a °atrate is not pro¯table we haven't seen attempts to enter this market with such an o®er.
Clearly, from a welfare perspective the lessons drawn above apply here as well and a complete
switch to a system like in the U.S. with °atrate tari®s for local calls would be preferable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a model with
consumer heterogeneity and derive the market structure. Section 3 discusses optimal policies in
that market for °atrate ¯rms. In Section 4 we show how new regulation is about to change the
industry and why Deutsche Telekom resisted this step of RegTP. Finally, we show in Section
5 that a discrete jump to a °atrate only equilibrium would improve welfare, while marginal
measures have ambiguous welfare e®ects. Section 6 concludes.
1Marginal costs are only zero in the absence of congestion, of course. In internet pricing congestion plays a
prominent role. See Mackie-Mason and Varian (1997) for an interesting suggestion for pricing internet tra±c.
In the local telephone network, by contrast, congestion is generally not a problem.
42 The Model
In our model we concentrate on two pricing systems, a linear price tari® with price p and a
°atrate f. We de¯ne these prices to be equal to the price for permanent online access for a
certain period. In the linear tari® the consumer pays a fraction of the price p according to the
time he was online, while the time online does not a®ect his expenditures for a °atrate, implying
a zero marginal price. We neglect the possibility of a two part tari® and other nonlinear pricing
systems, which only play an important role when the package o®ered by the ISP includes other
services like an e-mail account, a personal web-page etc. A simple explanation for this fact
might be ¯xed costs for the usage of the instruments p and f. Costs add up when using both
and make this possibility too costly. Consumers often prefer °atrate o®ers, because they do not
have to worry about the many technical possibilities to work o²ine and thereby minimize cost.
On the other hand, °atrate o®ers generally imply a sort of contract with the supplier which
reduces °exibility for consumers. We denote these costs sp and sf respectively. A consumer
buying from a °atrate supplier therefore saves an amount s = sp ¡sf which can be positive or
negative. Thus, we can interpret s as a preference of the consumer for the °atrate.
We assume that the utility from having online access at all ¹ u is large enough to ensure that
all consumers buy from at least one of the suppliers in the market. Following the standard
practice in the literature1 we also abstract from income e®ects. More precisely, the utility of a
consumer is U + ¹ u ¡ sp and U is given by:
U = u(h ¡ ¹ h) ¡ If(f ¡ s) ¡ Ipph; (1)
where u is a subutility function depending on the fraction of the period online h and a satiation
level ¹ h.2 The consumer buys either from the °atrate supplier (If = 1;Ip = 0) with °atrate f
1See, for example, Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991), p.28.
2We therefore do not assume the existence of network e®ects. See Economides (1996) for an overview of the
5which yields utility u(h¡¹ h)¡f ¡sf + ¹ u. Or she buys from the other supplier (If = 0;Ip = 1),
who charges a price per period p which yields u(h¡¹ h)¡ph¡sp+ ¹ u. The subutility is assumed
to be twice continuously di®erentiable and has the properties: u(0) = 0; u0(¢) > 0; u00(¢) < 0
and u0(0) = 0, the last of which establishes the interpretation of ¹ h as a bliss point.1
As discussed in the introduction, consumer heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the ISP market.
We take account of this fact by allowing the bliss points to di®er between consumers.2 More
precisely, we assume that consumers are distributed uniformly over the unit interval and have
bliss points according to the following linear function:3
¹ h(x) = h0 + h1x; 8x 2 [0;1] (2)
with h0;h1 > 0 and h0 + h1 · 1. Each consumer maximizes utility for both types and then
chooses the supplier yielding the higher utility. First, we solve the maximization problem for a
buy from the °atrate supplier:
hf = argmax
h
u(h ¡ ¹ h) ¡ f + s (3)
which has the following solution
u
0(hf ¡ ¹ h) = 0 , hf = ¹ h (4)
Obviously, the consumer facing a marginal cost of zero will consume up to his bliss point. The
literature on networks. We believe that network e®ect are not crucial for the choice of an ISP. Generally, neither
for the access to or exchange of information nor for communication is it necessary to have the same provider.
1A widely used example would be u = ¡0:5(¹ h ¡ h)2. See Mason (2000) for an application of this functional
form to internet pricing.
2The model is therefore an example of a single-parameter disaggregated model. For a general discussion of
this type of model, see Wilson (1993), p.125®.
3This restriction reduces the complexity of the analysis substantially. Linearity is also a common assumption
in the literature using Hotelling type \transportation costs" to model consumer heterogeneity. See La®ont et al.
(1998a) and La®ont et al. (1998b), for example.
6maximization problem of the consumer buying from the supplier with linear price delivers the
demand function for this scheme:
hp = argmax
h
u(h ¡ ¹ h) ¡ ph ) (5)
u
0(hp ¡ ¹ h) = p , (6)
hp = ¹ h + v(p) (7)
where v(p);v0(¢) < 0; is de¯ned as v(¢) = u0(¢)¡1.
Since consumers di®er in their bliss points it is likely that di®erent consumers opt for di®erent
suppliers. To analyze this in more detail we ¯rst take a look at the indi®erent consumer xi
who has identical maximum utilities for both suppliers, Uf = Up. We can easily identify the
position of this consumer on the unit interval:
Uf = Up ,
u(¹ h ¡ ¹ h) ¡ f + s = u(¹ h + v(p) ¡ ¹ h) ¡ p(¹ h + v(p)) ,








Let's for the moment assume that equation (8) leads to an interior solution. If this is the case
then it seems natural to assume that consumers to the left of the indi®erent consumer choose
one of the suppliers and consumers to the right choose the other. In fact, it is easy to prove
the following proposition.
7Proposition 1
If the indi®erent customer is an interior customer, then all customers to the left, with lower
bliss points, choose the supplier who charges a linear price and all customers to the right, with
higher bliss points, choose the °atrate supplier.
Proof: See Appendix.
It should be noted that this proposition, despite being very intuitive, is not as obvious as it
may seem. Actually, as discussed together with the proof in the Appendix, it is not possible
to extend the proof to arbitrary classes of continuous utility functions. The intuition for this
is as follows. To ensure that the proposition holds the maximum utility when choosing the
°atrate has to increase by more than the the maximum utility when choosing the linear price
when the bliss point rises. This is an assumption how utilities di®er between consumers and
the theoretical restrictions on modelling are very weak.
As a result of proposition 1 we can interpret xi as the market share of the supplier charging
a linear price and 1 ¡ xi as the market share of the °atrate supplier. From equation (8) it is







































all of which conform to intuition and need no further explanation. Market share of the °atrate
¯rm increases when it reduces its rate, when consumer preference for the °atrate increases,
when the other supplier increases his price and when the bliss point function has either a
steeper slope or a higher overall level.
8The last two e®ects deliver a good explanation of the double surprise that many °atrate ISPs
faced after market entry. They had both a lot more customers than they expected and much
higher usage than expected. This coincidence can be explained by a too low expectation of h0
or h1 or both.
3 The Optimal Flatrate
Now we take a look at the pro¯t maximizing strategy of the °atrate ¯rm. For a given price of




(f ¡ ¹ h(s)c)ds (9)
where c is marginal cost. In the Appendix we proof the following lemma.
Lemma 1
If p > c=2 the pro¯t maximizing rate for the °atrate ¯rm ful¯lls:
f = ph1(1 ¡ xi +
c
p
xi) + h0c (10)
Proof: See Appendix
Since the provider market in Germany is highly competitive with ¯erce price competition, we
assume in the following p = c. In this case the optimal °atrate is:
f = (h0 + h1)c (11)
and we can state the following proposition without further proof.
9Figure 1: The Optimal Flatrate
Proposition 2
If a °atrate ¯rm enters a competitive market it sets a °atrate such that it breaks even on the
consumer with the highest bliss point and therefore usage rate.
This is interesting, because it makes clear that there is no room for cross subsidization of
high usage customers with revenues from low usage customers. The intuition for this result
can be demonstrated by a graphical argument. In ¯gure 1 we plot the bliss point function
times marginal cost which represents cost per customer for the °atrate ¯rm. To facilitate the
discussion we set the slope of this function equal to one. This implies that the derivative of the
equilibrium market share with respect to the °atrate is also equal to one. We further assume
that the ¯rm considers a °atrate f below the optimal °atrate derived above and that the ¯rm
captures a market share xi.
It is not important whether the ¯rm makes any pro¯t at this market share. In any case, if the
¯rm increases the °atrate f by one euro this increases revenues from its existing customers by
AC euros. On the other hand the ¯rm will loose customers and thereby revenues of AB euros.
It is easy to verify that whatever the market share, the net gain of an increase in the °atrate
10is positive, as long as the °atrate is below the maximum of the cost per customer function.1
Another implication of this proposition is that the pricing decision is completely independent
of the preference for °atrates. The preference parameter s is only important to determine the
actual market share of the entering ¯rm, but not the optimal °atrate.2 In the end the optimal
price is easy to calculate, when taking into account that the customer with the highest bliss
point is likely to surf all day long. In this case h0 + h1 = 1 and the optimal price is simply
f = c. If the preference of consumers is high enough, then the entering ¯rm can gain market
share and since it breaks even with the customer with highest usage it makes pro¯ts on the
other customers. However, it is unlikely that the preference parameter is so high as to allow
the °atrate ¯rm to gain any market share.








s > u(v(p)) ¡ pv(p) ¡ p(h0 + h1) + f (12)
Using p = c and f = (h0 + h1)c from above we get
s > u(v(c)) ¡ cv(c) (13)
The right hand side is equal to the net gain of the customer with highest bliss point from
consuming less than the bliss point at price c. This implies that this customer is willing to pay
a price for a °atrate o®er that is as high as the price he would pay if he consumes up to the
bliss point from a supplier with linear price. For customers in the interior it even implies that
1If the slope of this function is di®erent from one then the graphical argument has to be augmented, because
the e®ect of f on the market share is di®erent. It might seem that a very steep function would lead to a di®erent
result. However, if the function is very steep then an increase in f has only a weak impact on the market share.
2This holds only for interior solutions of course. If the °atrate ¯rm serves the whole market the preference
parameter matters.
11they pay more than they would pay when consuming up to their bliss points at price c. If a
costumer can allow himself to forget about any marginal costs and stay online up to his bliss
point in the linear tari®, why should he pay even more for a °atrate that would imply exactly
the same consumption pro¯le. It is hard to imagine that s is that high.
4 New Regulation
It is still possible that the Deutsche Telekom will be obliged to o®er a wholesale °atrate in the
future. The result would be two wholesale tari®s, a linear tari® and a °atrate. In this case
the ISP has to decide how to allocate customer tra±c, which can be caused by both customers
using the °atrate and customers using the linear price, on the two types of lines. In this section
we derive the new market equilibrium.
Assume that there are at least two ¯rms o®ering a °atrate and a linear tari® and there is price
competition in both segments of the market. The crucial question is whether it is pro¯table
to use rented °atrate lines for customers using the linear tari® or the other way round. In the
appendix we show that this is not the case. Then, because of price competition, the price p
for the linear tari® will be equal to marginal cost c and the °atrate f has to be equal to the
wholesale °atrate per customer d.1 We can therefore prove the following proposition.
1We assume for simplicity in the following discussion that a ¯rm o®ering the °atrate does not incur any
other ¯xed costs.
12Proposition 3
When there are two wholesale tari®s, a °atrate and a price tari®, a market structure where
¯rms use linear tari® lines and charge marginal costs for customers paying a linear price, and
use °atrate lines for °atrate customers charging them the wholesale °atrate is the unique Nash
equilibrium when customers do not have a very strong preference for either the °atrate or the
linear tari®.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition here is that the indi®erent customer is certainly willing to pay more for a °atrate
line than what he spends in a linear tari®. Therefore it is not worthwhile for a ¯rm to use a
°atrate line for him when he is charged a linear tari®. However, because of decreasing marginal
utility, this will generally not be as much as his usage times marginal cost will rise when he
switches to a °atrate tari®. As a consequence, he would cause costs above the °atrate tari®
when he is charged a °atrate and the ¯rm uses a linear tari® line for him.
To better understand what the preferences of Deutsche Telekom regarding the future wholesale
°atrate are we have to derive their pro¯t maximizing choice of the wholesale price d, for a given
price c. To do that we have to make assumptions about the cost structure. Since Deutsche
Telekom is using to a very large extent existing infrastructure it seems reasonable to assume that
it has mainly ¯xed maintenance costs and that marginal costs are zero when a customer uses
a line. Even in the case of congestion this would be appropriate, since the costs of congestion
are generally borne by the consumers. This means that gross pro¯ts are simply revenues given
by:
¼ = d(1 ¡ xi) +
Z xi
0
c(¹ h(s) + v(c))ds (14)
For this de¯nition of pro¯t we can derive the following result.
13Proposition 4
For the regulated monopoly it would be optimal if the wholesale °atrate would be equal to the
expenditure of the consumer with the highest bliss point in a linear tari® with current wholesale
price c.
Proof: See Appendix
It is possible to use Figure 1 again to explain this result. The only di®erence is that we have to
substitute the c¹ h(x) line with the c(¹ h(x)+v(c)) line indicating revenues for Deutsche Telekom
from selling linear price lines to ISPs. Then, for any °atrate below the maximum of this line,
Deutsche Telekom could increase revenues from selling °atrate lines to ISPs by AC euros if it
increases the °atrate by one euro. And it would loose the di®erence between the °atrate and
the revenues from selling a linear tari® line, which amounts to AB euros. As before, there is a
positive net gain from increasing the °atrate.
It is possible that this optimal wholesale °atrate does not capture a large market share. For
the consumer with the highest bliss point it is certainly worthwhile to switch to the °atrate
because he can expand usage and still pay the same overall price. For other users, however, this
°atrate implies higher costs which has to be weighed against the possibility of unlimited access.
Currently marginal costs are already quite low which suggests that the willingness to pay for
unlimited access is not too high. If actual consumption of high usage customers is far above the
usage of average consumers, i.e. if the bliss point function is steep, than most costumers will
choose to remain in the linear tari®. As a consequence, pro¯ts for the optimal °atrate would
be close to pro¯ts without such a tari®. In such a situation it seems natural that Deutsche
Telekom resists the introduction of a wholesale °atrate, because the regulation authority will
not administer a tari® that does not gain market share. It is likely that RegTP targets not the
marginal, but the average customer and then pro¯ts for Deutsche Telekom are likely to fall.
Admittedly, this is inconsistent with the cost based model used by RegTP to calculate wholesale
14prices.1 If RegTP follows this approach then it ¯xes prices such that gross pro¯ts are just
su±cient for Deutsche Telekom to break even. We actually use this assumption in the following
chapter. In reality, however, there is a lot of discretion involved in the process of price ¯xing.
If RegTP should be successful in forcing Deutsche Telekom to introduce a wholesale °atrate
then it is rather questionable whether there will be an immediate o®setting increase in the
linear wholesale price. At least it will not be easy for Deutsche Telekom to prove that this is
necessary.
5 Welfare
In this section we assume that the goal of RegTP when making its decision about the wholesale
tari® structure of Deutsche Telekom is maximization of social welfare w under the restriction
of a certain minimum pro¯t ^ ¼. Because of consumer heterogeneity the welfare function is
not unique. We follow the usual practice in the theory of non-linear pricing2 and assume




w = (1 ¡ xi)s + xiu(v(c))
s.t. ^ ¼ = d(1 ¡ xi) +
Z xi
0
c(¹ h(s) + v(c))ds (15)
1The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Art.24(1), prescribes that wholesale prices have to equal to the
costs of e±cient service provision. RegTP calculates these costs using an analytical cost model. For detail see
www.regtp.de.
2See Wilson (1993) for an extensive discussion.
15Proposition 5
If marginal costs are zero and regulation has to assure a given level of pro¯ts then welfare
is maximized by using only a °atrate when the preference for the linear tari® is not very
high. If the market share of the linear tari® is positive a policy of increasing the linear tari®
and decreasing the °atrate keeping pro¯ts constant is welfare improving only if the change in
consumption of consumers in the linear tari® is below a certain threshold.
Proof: See Appendix
The ¯rst part of the proposition is obvious. Clearly, if we consider a discrete jump from any
market structure to an equilibrium with a °atrate only, this would be welfare improving for
reasonable values of s, i.e. s > u(v(c)). However, marginal measures put at least part of the
consumers at a disadvantage. For a given market share welfare would go down, because u(v(c))
would decline, while the reallocation of costs from °atrate customers to price tari® customers
is welfare neutral. The change in the market share, however, tends to increase welfare, because
more customers use the °atrate tari® and reach their bliss points. The trade o® involved here
requires a comparison of the gain in utility of the marginal customer with the reduction in
utility of all customers still using the linear tari®. Without additional assumptions about the
form of the utility this is not possible.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that consumer heterogeneity makes it di±cult for internet providers to o®er
a °atrate tari® when they face the same marginal costs as suppliers with linear tari®. Cross-
subsidization does not work and the ¯rm would have to make a pro¯t on the customer with the
highest usage rate. It is unlikely that customer preference for a °atrate is so high as to make
this possible. As a consequence, market entry was rare in Germany in the past. This will only
16change if the regulation authority RegTP forces Deutsche Telekom to o®er a wholesale °atrate
to ISP's. If the °atrate is not too high, this will allow ¯rms to make °atrate o®ers that actually
gain market share. Deutsche Telekom will continue to resist low °atrates that run counter to
pro¯t maximization given the regulated linear price.
If true marginal costs are zero it would be welfare improving if RegTP would force Deutsche
Telekom to abandon the linear wholesale tari® and rely on a wholesale °atrate only. This is
also important for other countries, like the UK, France, or Spain, that have already introduced
a wholesale °atrate. As long as there is an additional linear tari® that has a certain market
share there is room for improvement. In fact, it is not clear whether the introduction of a
wholesale °atrate is welfare improving if this leads to an upward adjustment of the linear
tari®. The reason is that the customers in the linear tari® loose from this policy and this has
to be weighed against the gains for customers that switch to the °atrate. If the demand of
customers in the linear tari® is very price sensitive then welfare decreases. Even if there is
no immediate o®setting increase in linear tari®s after the introduction of wholesale °atrates,
a resulting decline in gross pro¯ts for the regulated monopoly clearly reduces the possibilities
for rate reductions in the future. Rate reductions are actually quite common, mostly due to
technological progress. In this case the loss for customers in the linear tari® is more subtle, but
it is still an important part of the equation.
17Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:




























For the class of utilities u(h ¡ ¹ h) this is clearly true:
0 > ¡u
0(h ¡ ¹ h); 8h < ¹ h: (19)
For other classes of utilities this need not be the case however. Consider for example u(h; ¹ h) =
¡g(¹ h)(¹ h ¡ h)t with g(¢) > 0; g0(¢) < 0; 1 < t < 1. Here the condition is:
0 > ¡g
0(¹ h)(¹ h ¡ h)
t ¡ g(¹ h)(¹ h ¡ h)
t¡1: (20)
For g0(¹ h) ! ¡1 it is certainly not ful¯lled. Q.e.d.
18Proof of Lemma 1:
The ¯rst order condition for a pro¯t maximum is given by:
@¼f
@f
= 1 ¡ xi ¡
@xi
@f
(f ¡ ¹ h(xi)c) = 0 , (21)
1 ¡ xi ¡
1
ph1
(f ¡ (h0 + h1xi)c) = 0 (22)



















@f2 (f ¡ h(xi)c)
¸
< 0 (23)














and can be easily solved for p > c=2. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Assume that the linear tari® and the °atrate lead to an interior indi®erent customer at xi. If
the customer buys a °atrate he has consumption ¹ h(xi). If the ¯rm uses a linear price line it
pays ¹ h(xi)c, if it uses a °atrate line it pays d. The °atrate line is cheaper if:





[u(v(c)) ¡ cv(c) + d ¡ s] ¡ h0
¶
c > d ,
u(v(c)) ¡ cv(c) > s (25)
We already know from the discussion following the opposite condition in equation (13) that
this is very likely to be ful¯lled.
If the indi®erent customer buys a linear price line, he consumes h(c) = ¹ h(xi)+v(c). If the ¯rm
19uses a linear price line it pays (¹ h(xi)+v(c))c, if it uses a °atrate line it pays d. The linear price
line is cheaper if:
(¹ h(xi) + v(c))c < d ,
u(v(c)) < s (26)
which means that the preference for the linear price system (¡s) has to be smaller than u(0)¡
u(v(c)) = ¡u(v(c)), which is the di®erence between the bliss point and the utility in a price
tari® at price c. A higher preference would imply that if a ¯rm o®ers a consumer using a linear
tari® a °atrate that is equal to his current expenditures, then the consumer would prefer to
stay in the linear tari®. That's not impossible but unlikely.
If it does not pay to serve the indi®erent customer with a °atrate line when he uses a linear
tari®, then it certainly does not pay to use such a line for customers left of the indi®erent
customer. These customers all have a lower consumption and therefore cause lower costs on
the linear price line. A similar argument can be made for the other case. It is straightforward
that in a corner solution the incentives not to deviate are even stronger.
Finally, when ¯rms compete with prices, prices di®erent from marginal cost are not an equilib-
rium. This is a standard result in the literature. It should be noted that the wholesale price d
is not a ¯xed cost in the sense that it is independent of production. It is only ¯xed with respect
to usage not with respect to the number of customers. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4:
20The ¯rst order condition for a pro¯t maximum is given by:
@¼
@d






c(¹ h(xi) + v(c)) = 0 ,
(1 ¡ xi) +
1
ch1
(ch0 + ch1xi + cv(c) ¡ d) = 0 ,
c(h0 + h1 + v(c)) = d (27)






which completes the proof. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The ¯rst part is straightforward. For the second part we use the following ¯rst order condition












where the last term follows from the implicit function rule and constant pro¯ts. We additionally
make the following assumptions: wd;wc < 0, ¼d;¼c > 0 and s = 0. The ¯rst assumption about
welfare is always ful¯lled, we discuss the second one below. The assumptions about pro¯t have
to be ful¯lled in any sensible equilibrium if the ¯rst assumptions hold or the policy maker
would have a free lunch. The last assumption keeps the exposition simple without changing
the qualitative result.
Using these assumptions and the fact that u0 = c, v0 = @h=@c and u(v(c)) = ch(xi) ¡ d we can








@d (ch(xi) ¡ d)
@xi















Both sides are negative, because the numerators are negative and the denominators are positive.
If wc would be positive, which is possible, the condition would trivially be ful¯lled. If ¡@h=@c,
the derivative of demand, is large enough then wc < 0. The derivative only shows up once in














If the derivative is comparatively large, we are close the upper bound and marginal pro¯ts are
close to zero. In this case the condition is not ful¯lled and welfare goes down when the °atrate
is reduced, because the constant pro¯ts restriction requires a very strong increase in the linear
tari®. If the derivative is close to the lower bound, marginal welfare is close to zero and welfare
is improving when the °atrate is reduced. Q.e.d.
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